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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).

Plaintiff brings this appeal

from the December 7, 1989 order by the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy
presiding, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and dismissing with
prejudice plaintiff's amended complaint against defendant.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in dismissing with prejudice

plaintiff's first and second causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing?
2.

Did plaintiff waive her claims against State Farm by

her settling the underlying related action?
3.

Has plaintiff waived or abandoned any claim of error

on the dismissal of her third cause of action for fraud?
4.

Did the affidavit of Milton Q. Beck raise any issues

of material fact in a third-party type claim?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of a summary judgment, the party against whom
the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts
presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to him.

To sustain a summary

judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences
therefrom, viewed most favorably to the losing party, must show
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that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); English
v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the
sole determinative authority on appeal.

Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.,

provides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 12, 1984, plaintiff Fay Pixton was involved in
an automobile accident with an unattended runaway vehicle owned by
Robert J. Davies.

(R. 190)

At the time of her accident, plain-

tiff was insured by defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (hereinafter "State Farm") under Policy No.
477-64-44 (hereinafter the "Pixton policy").

(R. 189-190)

Robert

Davies, at the time of the accident, was also insured by defendant
State Farm under his own policy of insurance (hereinafter the
"Davies policy").

(R. 190)

Immediately following her accident, plaintiff sought
treatment at a local hospital for her injuries.

Plaintiff was

diagnosed at the hospital as having suffered abrasions to her
kneecap and wrist.

(Id.)

Plaintiff received treatment for her
-2-

injuries from several physicians, including Dr. Edward C. Spencer.
A Dr. Matthews referred plaintiff to Dr. Edward C. Spencer for
treatment.

(R. 220, 241-42)

At all times, Dr. Spencer's care and

treatment of plaintiff were within the acceptable medical standards
of the community.

(R. 240)

Dr. Spencer's treatment and evalua-

tion of plaintiff's injuries were not influenced or affected by
any actions of State Farm.

(icL )

On or about July 5, 1984, State Farm's claims handling
agent, Felix Jensen, contacted International Rehabilitation
Associates, Inc. (hereinafter "IRA") to assist in evaluating
plaintiff's medical condition.

(R. 99, 220)

State Farm and IRA

enjoy a long-standing relationship in which State Farm
periodically hires IRA to assess all factors connected with the
recovery of an insured or claimant, including coordinating goaldirected medical treatment and evaluating the outcome of the
treatment plan once treatment is completed.

(R. 220-21)

At all times, State Farm promptly and fully reimbursed
plaintiff for all out-of-pocket medical expenses and other
expenses incurred by her in connection with the medical treatments
necessitated by her injuries.

State Farm paid a total of $871.51

to plaintiff pursuant to plaintiff's first-party personal injury
protection or no-fault insurance coverage with State Farm.
(R. 236-38)

At the time of her automobile accident, the no-fault

threshold under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 was $500.
Plaintiff subsequently made a third-party claim or demand
upon State Farm, as the liability insurer of the alleged
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tortfeasor, Robert J. Davies, for additional damages allegedly
sustained by her in the automobile accident of March 12, 1984.
State Farm initially offered the sum of $2,500 to plaintiff to
settle her third-party claims under Davies' liability coverage
with State Farm.
194-95)

Plaintiff refused State Farm's offer.

(R.

Thereafter, plaintiff demanded that State Farm and IRA

inform her of the costs of services rendered by IRA for State Farm
in evaluating her medical treatment and condition.
Farm and IRA refused.

Both State

(R. 189-201)

On or about March 4, 1987, plaintiff brought this action
against State Farm and IRA alleging various causes of action.
Plaintiff alleged that State Farm had breached its insurance contract with plaintiff, had breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, had conspired to deny plaintiff access to
the courts, and had negligently engaged in unfair or deceptive
practices.

(R. 2-13)

Plaintiff subsequently amended her com-

plaint to allege causes of action in breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud
against State Farm.

(R. 190-201)

On or about December 8, 1987, plaintiff filed suit in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County against Robert
J. Davies and one of Mr. Davies' employees, Carl Hothan, for her
damages and injuries arising out of the accident of March 12,
1984.

(R. 222, 303)

Plaintiff's suit against Davies and Hothan

was assigned to the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick.

See, Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, C87-7987 (hereinafter
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the "underlying related action,")
During the pendency of the underlying related action,
plaintiff's counsel served interrogatories on defendants Davies
and Hothan requesting that State Farm identify the number of payments made by State Farm to IRA and the total amount paid by State
Farm which was claimed "exempt from the plaintiff's claim . . . ."
(R. 304)

On or about April 18, 1988, counsel for Davies and

Hothan disclosed that State Farm had paid $871.51 for plaintiff's
medical expenses, $708.00 for plaintiff's lost services, and
$1,960.09 for IRA's services.

(R. 93, R. 304)

On or about May

24, 1988, copies of the drafts from State Farm to IRA were
forwarded to plaintiff's counsel for his review.

(R. 305)

In this litigation and in the underlying related action,
State Farm took the position that the cost of IRA's evaluation
services was properly categorized as a "file expense," rather than
a "medical expense."

State Farm's characterization of the cost of

IRA's services did not impact plaintiff's right to bring the
underlying related action against Davies and Hothan because
plaintiff had already reached the applicable $500.00 no-fault
threshold under Utah law.
On or about December 21, 1988, IRA moved for summary
judgment on plaintiff's claims.
4, 1989.

(R. 204-05)

IRA's motion was granted on April

Plaintiff has never perfected an appeal

from the order dismissing her claims against IRA.
During the course of the underlying related action,
plaintiff's counsel sought a determination from Judge Frederick
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that the $1,960.09 paid by State Farm to IRA constituted "medical
expenses."

Judge Frederick refused to rule on the plaintiff's

motion prior to the time of trial.

(R. 363 at pp. 9-10)

Rather

than press for a ruling at trial, plaintiff on or about May 9,
1989, agreed to accept the sum of $7,500.00 in full and complete
satisfaction of her claims against the alleged tortfeasors, Robert
J. Davies and Carl Hothan.

(R. 195, 303-06)

The underlying

related action was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the
parties and by order of the trial court.

(R. 306)

After settlement of the underlying related action, on or
about May 12, 1989, plaintiff filed her amended complaint against
State Farm asserting breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.

(R. 190-201)

Plaintiff's asserted causes of action arise out of State Farm's
alleged wrongful refusal to disclose the cost of the evaluative
services rendered by IRA for State Farm, State Farm's alleged
wrongful "failure" to disclose the purpose of IRA's services, and
State Farm's alleged improper relationship with Dr. Edward C.
Spencer, plaintiff's treating physician.

(Id.)

On or about July 5, 1990, defendant State Farm moved for
summary judgment on plaintiff's amended complaint.

Following

extensive briefing and oral argument, the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy
presiding, on December 7, 1989, entered an order granting State
Farm's motion for summary judgment.

(R. 351-53)

Plaintiff now appeals from the December 7, 1989 order
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summarily dismissing her claims with prejudice.

On appeal, plain-

tiff's docketing statement alleged that the granting of summary
judgment on her three causes of action was in error.

However,

based upon the issues raised in plaintiff's brief, plaintiff
apparently confesses no error in the trial court's granting of
summary judgment on plaintiff's third cause of action for fraud.
This Court's review of the trial court's ruling is, therefore,
limited to the dismissal of plaintiff's claims of breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In order to maintain a cause of action for breach of an
insurance contract or insurer bad faith, plaintiff and State Farm
must have been in privity of contract at the time of the alleged
wrong.

Plaintiff makes no claim and presents no evidence that

State Farm failed to fully and satisfactorily perform its
contractual duties to pay no-fault benefits to plaintiff under her
insurance policy contract.

Plaintiff's claims in this case con-

cern solely State Farm's actions in not initially disclosing those
expenses related to IRA's services and State Farm's internal
characterization of those expenses as "file expenses."

As such,

plaintiff contends that State Farm was somehow guilty of bad faith
in the handling of her third-party claim against Robert Davies and
Carl Hothan, also State Farm insureds.

Plaintiff has no standing

to assert contract based claims regarding State Farm's treatment
of her as a third-party claimant, since she was not a party to the
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contract for liability coverage between Davies and State Farm.
Plaintiff's actions in not pursuing a ruling before Judge
Frederick in the underlying related action concerning the
disclosure and proper characterization of IRA's services and
expenses and eventually settling that action, constitute a waiver
of plaintiff's claims against defendant State Farm.
Plaintiff's failure to brief the propriety of the trial
court's dismissal of her third cause of action further bars any
assignment of error on that issue on appeal.
The affidavit of Milton Q. Beck submitted by plaintiff
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact.

Mr. Beck's

affidavit misapplies the pertinent rule of law in the State of
Utah relative to a claim of bad faith by a claimant against a
tortfeasor's insurer.

Mr. Beck's affidavit most importantly

failed to refute the undisputed evidence that State Farm fully and
promptly satisfied its duties to plaintiff for no-fault benefits
under her own policy of insurance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WERE PROPERLY
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO BRING SUCH
CLAIMS AGAINST STATE FARM.
Plaintiff, on appeal and in the court below, asserts that
State Farm breached various contractual duties, both express and
implied, owed to plaintiff.

In reviewing plaintiff's assignments

of error, this Court must categorize State Farm's duties, if any,
-8-

in accordance with the relationship between the parties and the
coverages provided under the two pertinent State Farm insurance
policies, the Pixton policy and the Davies policy.

Although not

clearly set forth in plaintiff's brief, plaintiff had separate and
distinct claims against each of the two respective insurance policies issued by State Farm.

Plaintiff had claim against State Farm

under her own insurance policy for first-party personal injury
protection ("PIP") or "no-fault" benefits.

Plaintiff also had

claim against State Farm, through the alleged tortfeasor, Davies,
for third-party liability benefits under the Davies policy.
The legal and contractual relationships between the parties in the instant action and the underlying related action
define the scope of State Farm's duties to plaintiff.

In the

first-party context where plaintiff was entitled by contract to
recover "no-fault" benefits under her own policy, the relation
between State Farm and plaintiff was purely contractual.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985).

Beck v.

In essence,

an insurer in a first-party claim has the primary duty not to
withhold unreasonably insurance benefits due under its insured's
own policy.

In first-party claims where an insured makes claim

against its own insurer, no fiduciary relationship of trust or
reliance is created by the insurance contract.

Ic3. Practically

speaking, in first-party claims, an insurer and its insureds are
adversaries.

Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 Utah

2d 311, 480 P.2d 739, 745 (1971), overruled on other grounds, 701
P.2d 798 (1985) .
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In the context of third party claims brought by an
injured party against the tortfeasor's insurer, both contractual
and fiduciary duties run between the insured tortfeasor and his
insurance carrier.

In handling, adjusting, and settling third-

party claims, the tortfeasor's insurer owes a duty only to its
insured, namely to accept reasonable settlements.

Such duties are

most pronounced in cases involving the risk of excess verdicts.
Plaintiff, nevertheless, suggests that third-party claims
also give rise to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
between the tortfeasor's insurer and the injured party.
Plaintiff's reliance on Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566,
108 Cal.Rptr. 887, 510 P.2d 1032 (1970), and Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), in support of such a proposition is ill-founded.

Even a casual review of plaintiff's

authorities reveals that neither case involved a third-party
claim.

Gruenberg arose out of an insurer's bad faith actions in

investigating a first-party fire loss of its own insured.

In

Beck, the Utah Supreme Court recognized a contract-based cause of
action for insurer bad faith in the context of a first-party
uninsured motorist claim.
While no Utah case has ever expressly dealt with whether
an insurer owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to a
claimant, those jurisdictions which have addressed the issue have
squarely rejected a duty of good faith between an insurer and a
claimant.

See O.K. Lumber v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 759

P.2d 523, 525-26 (Alaska 1988); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74
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Ill.App.3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718, 720-21 (1979); Auclair v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 505 A.2d 431 (R.I. 1986); Kranzush v.
Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256,
259 (1981).

Even the courts of California, which at one time rec-

ognized a duty of good faith between an insurer and a claimant in
the handling of third-party claims, have now rejected any such
duty.

See Moradi-Shalal v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.3d 287, 250

Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58 (1988), overruling, Royal Globe Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.3d 880, 153 Cal.Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d
329 (1979).

See also, Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal.3d 937,

132 Cal.Rptr. 424, 553 P.2d 584, 586-89 (1976).
The Utah Supreme Court's pronouncement in Beck that
insurance bad faith is a contract-based theory, rather than a tort
theory, led this Court in Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950, 958 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), to hold that, "In order to
maintain an action under a contractual theory of insurer bad
faith, the parties must be in privity of contract at the time of
the alleged wrong."

Since a claimant and a tortfeasor's insurer,

in a third-party claim, are not in privity of contract, the
injured claimant has no standing to bring an action against the
insurer for breach of contract or bad faith, even if the injured
party's insurer by coincidence also happens to be the tortfeasor's
insurer.

See Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exhange, 19 Utah 2d 261,

430 P.2d 576 (1967) .
In the instant case, plaintiff had two distinct and separate claims against State Farm under two separate policies of
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insurance.

Plaintiff had a first-party claim for no-fault bene-

fits under her own policy; and plaintiff also had a third-party
claim for both general and special damages against the tortfeasor,
Davies, under his insurance policy with State Farm.

While

plaintiff is in privity of contract with State Farm under her own
policy, plaintiff has no contractual privity with State Farm under
the Davies policy.

The mere fact that the alleged tortfeasor and

the plaintiff were both State Farm insureds does not confer standing on plaintiff to bring the instant action sounding in contract
against State Farm on Davies policy.

Id.

If plaintiff had claimed and established in the court
below that State Farm had wrongfully denied or delayed her nofault benefits, plaintiff undisputably would have standing under
her own insurance contract to bring suit for breach of contract
and/or bad faith against State Farm.

However, the undisputed

facts in this case establish that State Farm promptly and fully
reimbursed plaintiff for all covered expenses related to her
accident, pursuant to her first-party no-fault coverage with State
Farm.

(R. 236-39)

There is no evidence in the record that State

Farm ever breached any express or implied contractual provision or
duty with respect to plaintiff's claims under her own policy of
insurance.
Correctly viewed, this case arises solely out of
plaintiff's claim that State Farm allegedly mishandled the
investigation and settlement of her third-party claims against
Robert Davies and Carl Hothan.

Plaintiff simply has no standing
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to bring the instant action against State Farm, asserting that
State Farm unfairly or improperly handled her third-party claim
against Davies and Hothan.

At best, plaintiff may claim to be an

incidental third-party beneficiary under the Davies policy.

Utah

law is clear, however, that incidental third-party beneficiaries
may not bring an action in contract.

See Tracy Collins Bank and

Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982); Schwinghammer v.
Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414 (1968).

As a result,

plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and bad faith in the
adjustment and settlement of her claims against the alleged
tortfeasors were correctly dismissed by the trial court as a matter of law.
Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff had standing to
bring a contract-based action against State Farm for the company's
handling of her third-party claim, plaintiff's assertion that
State Farm allegedly acted improperly in creating a "conflict of
interest" in permitting a single adjuster to handle both plaintiff's first and third-party claims fails.

Plaintiff is unable to

point to a single contractual duty, either express or implied,
that would require separate adjusters to handle plaintiff's first
and third-party claims.

Plaintiff likewise fails to acknowledge

that in the handling of her first-party claims, an insurer, its
employees, and the insured are practically speaking adversaries.
Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745.

Under such circumstances, plaintiff's

claim that State Farm's failure to employ multiple adjusters to
handle her claims fails to sustain any allegations that State
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Farm's actions amounted to a breach of contract or a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
POINT II.
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT STATED A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED,
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS HAVE BEEN WAIVED DUE
TO HER SETTLEMENT OF THE UNDERLYING
RELATED ACTION.
Plaintiff's principal disputes in this case are with how
State Farm handled and characterized the expenses related to the
services of IRA.

Plaintiff claims that State Farm's initial

refusal to disclose the cost of IRA's services and State Farm's
categorization of those expenses as "file expenses" deprived her
of settling her case for "what it was worth."

It should be first

noted that case valuations, like potential jury verdict ranges,
cannot be precisely ascertained or predicted.

The value of each

case turns upon its own merits, facts, and the eventual finder of
fact, whether a jury, judge, or the parties themselves.
In this case, the undisputed evidence is that plaintiff
was given the information concerning the cost of IRA's services
more than one year prior to her settlement with the alleged
tortfeasors, Davies and Hothan.

Plaintiff's voluntary and knowing

action in accepting the settlement offer of $7,500 in the underlying related action serves as an estoppel or a waiver of her claim
that State Farm's settlement was unreasonable or inadequate.
While State Farm's characterization of IRA's expenses may
have arguably influenced State Farm's offers of settlement, State
Farm's actions cannot be said to have improperly influenced
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plaintiff's knowing and volitional act in accepting State Farm's
offer.

Plaintiff cannot ignore the fact that her settlement came

more than one year after State Farm made a full disclosure of all
expenses related to IRA's activities.

The undisputed evidence in

this case required the trial court to find that plaintiff waived
her claims by accepting the settlement proceeds and stipulating to
the dismissal of the underlying related action.
Plaintiff also asserts that State Farm's initial settlement offer of $2,500 and the company's later settlement for $7,500
further evidenced State Farm's bad faith.

It cannot be seriously

contended by plaintiff that the alleged tortfeasors or their
insurer, State Farm, had any legal duty to offer or pay anything
to plaintiff for her third-party claim until the liability of the
alleged tortfeasors and plaintiff's damages had been judicially
determined.

Furthermore, State Farm's actions did not deprive

plaintiff of any right to negotiate a higher settlement or to
proceed to trial in hopes of recovering more than $7,500 in
damages.

The fact that State Farm increased its original offer of

settlement from $2,500 to $7,500 is evidence that State Farm was,
in fact, willing to negotiate with plaintiff.

Even assuming that

plaintiff's rights to negotiate,and settle her claim for a more
favorable amount were impaired by State Farm's actions, plaintiff
waived any right to challenge the sufficiency and adequacy of her
settlement by refusing to proceed to trial in the underlying
related action in order to obtain a favorable ruling from Judge
Frederick on the proper categorization of IRA's expenses, by

-15-

accepting the settlement proceeds, and by stipulating to the dismissal with prejudice of the underlying related action.
Furthermore, affirmance of the trial court's order
granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm is required due
to plaintiff's inability to show any damages flowing from State
Farm's initial refusal to disclose the cost of IRA's services and
State Farm's characterization of those costs.

State Farm paid

plaintiff what it believed plaintiff's case to be worth, $7,500.
Assuming that State Farm had characterized IRA's costs as "medical
expenses" and readily disclosed those costs to plaintiff, as
plaintiff claims should have been done, there is no evidence in
the record that State Farm would have ever offered plaintiff more
than $7,500 to settle her claims.

Absent such evidence,

plaintiff's claims were properly dismissed by the trial court.
Plaintiff asserts in her brief that State Farm did not
properly raise the affirmative defense of waiver in its answer.
(Appellant's Brief at p. 16)

State Farm respectfully submits that

its answer to plaintiff's amended complaint contained the following defense:
5.

(R. 207)

That the plaintiff by her conduct either
waived any claim that she may have against
this defendant or in the alternative is
estopped by virtue of her conduct from
bringing any claims against this defendant.

Despite plaintiff's contention to the contrary, the

record demonstrates that State Farm affirmatively asserted the
defenses of waiver and estoppel and, therefore, the trial court
was correct in ruling as a matter of law that plaintiff waived any

-16-

potential claims she might have had against State Farm by accepting the settlement in the underlying related action.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF ERROR ON
THE DISMISSAL OF HER THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR FRAUD.
Plaintiff's amended complaint contains various unfounded
allegations that State Farm had engaged in fraudulent conduct in
association with Dr. Edward C. Spencer and IRA.

(R. 197-99)

The

trial court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment on
all causes of action, including the third cause of action for
fraud.

(R. 351-53)

Plaintiff on January 5, 1990 duly filed her

notice of appeal, preserving a potential claim of error on her
third cause of action for fraud against State Farm.

(R. 358-59)

Plaintiff's docketing statement likewise indicated that the
propriety of the court's ruling with respect to the plaintiff's
claim of fraud would be raised on appeal.

However, appellant's

brief, dated July 11, 1990, contains no discussion or analysis of
the plaintiff's claims of fraud on the part of State Farm.
It is well established that an appellant's failure to
raise an issue in the initial appellant's brief constitutes a
waiver or abandonment of any assignment of error on that issue on
appeal.

See Union Oil Co. of California v. State, 677 P.2d 1256,

1259 (Alaska 1984); Quality Furniture, Inc. v. Hay, 61 Hawaii 89,
595 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1979); Northwest National Gas Co. v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 53 Or.App. 89, 630 P.2d 1326, 1329 (1981),
review denied, 291 Or. 893, 642 P.2d 309 (1981); Kurpjuweit v.
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Northwestern Development Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 46 (Wyo. 1985).
As a result, appellant's failure to raise any issues relative to
her third cause of action for fraud bars plaintiff from now
asserting on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing her
claims of fraud.
POINT IV.

'- •.

THE AFFIDAVIT OF MILTON Q. BECK DID NOT
RAISE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court
improperly found that the affidavit of Milton Q. Beck failed to
create a dispute as to any issue of material fact which would
preclude the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff.
Plaintiff urges first that the trial court erred in disregarding
the affidavit of Mr. Beck because the court had not read the
affidavit.

(Appellant's Brief at p. 15)

The transcript of the

hearing on State Farm's motion for summary judgment reveals that
the trial court initially had not been aware of the Beck affidavit
because plaintiff did not file the affidavit in conjunction with
State Farm's motion for summary judgment.

(R. 36 3 at p. 11)

In

fact, the Beck affidavit had been filed more than seven months
prior to the filing of State Farm's motion.

(R. 90-95, 246-47)

Nevertheless, after locating the affidavit in the file, Judge
Murphy read the affidavit and permitted oral argument to continue.
(R. 36 3 at p. 12)

After further argument, the trial court held

that the affidavit of Mr. Beck did not create a genuine issue of
material fact, and ordered summary judgment in favor of State
Farm.
-18-

The trial court's finding that the affidavit of Mr. Beck
did not create an issue of fact in a third-party claim type of
case was clearly correct.

Plaintiff asserts that the Beck

affidavit should preclude the entry of summary judgment, since
similar affidavits of Mr. Beck were held to create issues of fact
in Beck v. Farmers, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), and American Concept
Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that both Beck and
Lochhead involved first-party claims.

Beck arose out of an

insurer's handling of its insured's uninsured motorist claim, and
Lochhead arose out of an insurer's handling of its insured's
first-party fire loss.

Unlike Beck and Lochhead, this case

involves a third-party claim where the insurer, State Farm, owes
no duty to the claimant, plaintiff.

Despite Mr. Beck's ill-

founded conclusion that State Farm owed contractual and fiduciary
duties to a party not in privity of contract with State Farm, Utah
law is clearly to the contrary.

Mr.

Beck's affidavit presupposes

that the same standards should apply to an insurer handling a
third-party claim with a claimant as with its own insureds in the
handling of a first-party claim.

Mr. Beck's affidavit addresses

only State Farm's actions in the handling of plaintiff's thirdparty claim against the alleged tortfeasors, Davies and Hothan.
His affidavit is silent in rebutting the undisputed evidence that
State Farm promptly and fully satisfied its contractual duties to
plaintiff for no-fault benefits under her own insurance contract.
As a result, the trial court was correct in holding that the Beck
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affidavit failed to create a dispute as to any issue of material
fact which would preclude summary judgment.

The ruling of the

trial court should, therefore, be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the decision of the lower court,
Dated this

day of

, 1990

STRONG GXHANNI

5

'^Jfo.

hilip7R. Fishier
Stephen J. Trayner
Attorneys for State Farm

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

rtk

J2

day of

, 1990, four true and correct copies of the
oing document were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Matt Biljanic
7155 South 9th East
Midvale, Utah 84047

S45/Bnh
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FAY I. PIXTON,

:
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,

vs.

:

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF
BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS

:

Civil No. C 87-1665

:

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.

:

Comes now the above named Plaintiff and for her
cause of action against State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company of Bloomington, Illinois

alleges as

follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County

State of Utah, and the facts giving rise to this cause of
action occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

That Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance, is an insurance company with its home office in
Bloomington, Illinois, doing business in the State of Utah.
3.

That on March 12, 1984, the Plaintiff was

,000001

insured by State Farm Mutual under policy #477-6467-44
covering a 1973 Maverick with the following coverage:
liability 50/100/25; $10,000.00, PIP, Emergency Road Service
and Uninsured Motorist Coverage.
4.

That on March 12, 1984, Plaintiff was involved

in an incident involving another insured of State Farm
Mutual, Robert J. Davies. An unattended vehicle owned by
Robert J. Davies as insured, and parked by an employee of
Davies, struck the vehicle which Plaintiff was driving
causing her to sustain injuries requiring medical attention.
That liability rests clearly with the Davies vehicle.
5.

That Plaintiff incurred medical treatment at

the emergency room of Alta Hospital and later from Dr.
Edward C. Spencer.
6.

That Plaintiff, subsequent to March 12, 1984,

was contacted by an employee of International Rehabilitation
Associates Inc., concerning the injuries she sustained in
the incident referred to in paragraph 4 above.
7.

That Plaintiff did not make any effort to

contact the International Rehabilitation Associates Inc.
regarding her injuries or rehabilitation, but rather was
contacted by them without solicitation.

Plaintiff assumes

that State Farm, through its agent, Felix Jensen or some

2
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other employee of State Farm, was responsible for arranging
the contact with Rehabilitation Associates.

The purpose of

contacting IRA was to obtain rehabilitation services •
The Defendant failed to advise Plaintiff that IRA employees
as registered nurses were hired by Defendant not to assist
in Plaintiff's rehabilitation but rather as non-testimonial
experts.

(As per counsel, Phillip Fishier1s representation

to the Court).
8. That Plaintiff and International Rehabilitation
Associates, Debi Johnson and Jan Wherry Mason, through
contact and subsequent conduct established a fiduciary
relationship as health care providers.

Further, Plaintiff

and State Farm Insurance Company by virtue of the insurance
contract #477-6467-44 established a fiduciary relationship
during the pendency of the policy.
9. The insurance policy between Plaintiff and
State Farm Insurance was in force and effective March 12,
1984, the occasion where Plaintiff sustained injuries and
damages which are the subject matter of this claim.
Plaintiff had made all required premium payments.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract by State Farm)
10. The Plaintiff hereby repleads all of the
3
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allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 as though
fully set forth herein,
11.

After receiving the claim of the Plaintiff

for damages she sustained on March 12, 1984, State Farm
Mutual was under a duty, by virtue of its insurance contract
with the Plaintiff, to process her claim promptly after
making a reasonable investigation of the facts.
12.

That Plaintiff by virtue of the insurance

contract with Defendant, State Farm,was entitled to
reimbursement for property damages and any out of pocket
expenses relating to medical care which was required because
of the Plaintiff's injuries sustained in the incident
involving State Farm's other insured.

Further, the

Plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for mental and
physical pain and suffering.
13.

That Felix Jensen as an employee of State

Farm directed the Plaintiff to IRA for what she believed was
medical treatment of her injuries. That Felix Jensen failed
to disclose the fact that IRA was used as a non-testimonial
expert by IRA in many of its third party claims and in this
case.

4
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14.

That State Farm through its employee Felix

Jensen should have directed the Plaintiff to a medical
doctor who did not have direct ties with State Farm as a
medical expert or should have advised the Plaintiff of his
relationship with the Defendant State Farm.
15.

That during the several months Plaintiff was

seen by Dr. Edward C. Spencer, Felix Jensen retained the
services of IRA as non-testimonial experts to evaluate the
Plaintiff's claim.

That Plaintiff believed that the two

registered nurses of IRA upon contacting her were going to
assist her in recovering from her injuries.

She was never

informed of their function as non-testimonial experts nor
was she aware that State Farm was preparing for a lawsuit.
16.

That by the actions of State Farm insurance

in creating a conflict of interest between the Plaintiff and
what she believed were health care providers (Dr. Spencer
and IRA) State Farm in effect breached its contract with the
Plaintiff.

That Plaintiff is entitled to consequential

damages as a result of State Farm's breach as follows:
(a)

Plaintiff has been denied adequate medical

care for the injuries she sustained March 12, 1984. That as
a result of the delay in now obtaining medical attention her
5

situation has been aggravated and the medical problem more
difficult to resolve.
(b)

That because of the fiduciary relationship of

Plaintiff with State Farm, Dr. Edward C. Spencer, and the
IRA employees and her perceived mistreatment, Plaintiff has
suffered extreme emotional distress.
The natural consequences of the breach of contract
by State Farm by its actions as set forth above, clearly
resulted in Plaintiff's suffering severe and permanent
mental and physical damages.
17.

That as a part of her contract with State

Farm the Plaintiff reasonably expected State Farm to process
her claim promptly and with all necessary information
required to fully evaluate her claim.

That Plaintiff made

demand upon State Farm to provide to her the amount of
charges made by IRA to State Farm for what she believed were
medical expenses.

State Farm refused to divulge this

information and said actions constituted a breach of its
insurance contract with Plaintiff.
18.

That on May 30, 1985,State Farm tendered the

sum of $2,500.00 to Plaintiff as a full compromise and
settlement of her claim. Those actions of State Farm set
forth in the previous paragraphs constitute an additional
6
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breach of contract.

That as a result of State Farm's

refusal to settle fairly and consistently with the customary
practice in the industry the Plaintiff was required to
employ the services of Matt Biljanic, attorney, on a
contingent fee basis to recover her damages.

That said

attorney's fees were a direct result and consequence of
Defendant's breach of contract.
19.

That as a result of the Defendants actions

the Plaintiff compromised her claim against Defendant's
insured, Robert J. Davies, for the sum of $7,500.00,
substantially less than would normally be offered under
similar facts.

Further, Plaintiff has retained counsel on a

1/3 contingency because of Defendant's refusal to settle in
good faith.

That $2,500.00 was paid from said proceeds to

Plaintiff's counsel.

That $2,500.00,together with the

difference between $11,326.00 and $7,500.00 are
consequential damages sustained by Plaintiff as a result of
Defendant's breach of contract.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing by State Farm)
20.

The Plaintiff hereby restates all of the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 17 of the
First Cause of Action as though fully set forth herein.
7

21.

That Plaintiff had a justifiable expectation

that State Farm Insurance would provide to her all amounts
paid by State Farm for medicals incurred or expenses
relating to treatment and or rehabilitation of Plaintiff.
That this information was necessary before a final
resolution of Plaintiff's claim could be attempted.
22.

That Defendant, State Farm Insurance, acted

arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably by refusing to
divulge said information to Plaintiff.

That said conduct on

State Farm's part exceeded the justifiable expectations of
the Plaintiff and she should be awarded compensatory
damages, and punitive damages for said culpable conduct.
That said conduct on the part of State Farm was unreasonable
under the facts of this case.
That State Farm breached its duty to the Plaintiff
by failing to employ two (2) separate adjusters, one for the
Plaintiff and one for the other driver.

That State Farm

further breached its duty by failing to advise the Plaintiff
of their extensive use of him as an expert witness in
numerous third party claim suits. That State Farm further
breached its duty by creating and or maintaining the obvious
conflicts of interest between IRA, Dr. Edward C. Spencer,
State Farm and the Plaintiff.
8
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23.

Because of the Defendant's actions in denying

the Plaintiff her right to settle her claim in good faith,
the Plaintiff should be awarded damages for attorney's fees
incurred together with that amount which she could
reasonably have settled her claim for had the Defendant not
acted in bad faith, to-wit: $11,326.00 less the $7,500.00
actually received.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Fraud)
24.

The Plaintiff hereby restates all of the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 of the
Plaintiff's First and Second Cause of Action as though fully
set forth herein.
25.

That State Farm, through its employee, Felix

Jensen, failed to disclose to Plaintiff that Dr. Edward C.
Spencer had been in fact employed by Defendant on numerous
occasions as a medical expert in third party claims. That
Defendant either led the Plaintiff to believe or allowed the
Plaintiff to believe without disclosure that Dr. Edward C.
Spencer would care for and meet her medical needs without
having to consider the needs of State Farm.

By acting for

State Farm and for the Plaintiff the doctor was serving two
masters at one time and the arrangement clearly constituted
9

a conflict of interest.
26. That State Farm, through its agent, Felix
Jensen, failed to disclose to Plaintiff that employees of
IRA (nurses) were actually non-testimonial experts preparing
for trial (as represented by counsel for State Farm) and not
health care providers helping with her rehabilitation. That
this arrangement was contrary to representations in the
advertising brochure of IRA and contrary to the medical
reports and correspondence of the registered nurses.
27.

That State Farm had actual or constructive

knowledge of the false representations or deceitful actions
of its employee and the IRA employees.
28.

That State Farm, through Felix Jensen,

arranged the involvement of IRA with Plaintiff for the
purpose of minimizing medical expenses and eventual damages
and not to meet Plaintiff's medical problems.

That IRA

now claims it was only evaluating Plaintiff's rehabilitation
needs and not providing rehabilitation services.
29.

That Plaintiff relied upon the actions of

State Farm and its misrepresentations by non-disclosure to
her detriment and has been denied reasonable medical care as
a result thereof.

Further, the Plaintiff has suffered

severe physical and mental pain as a result of said deceit.
10

30.

That as a result of State Farm's fraudulent

acts the Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in
addition to compensatory damages listed above together with
that amount of attorney's fees she was required to pay on
contingency together with court costs incurred herein. That
Defendant attempted to deceive the Plaintiff by advising her
that she was not entitled to know the amount paid to IRA
since the Defendant paid those sums and they were not
medical expenses.

These actions were all contrary to

customary insurance practice.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against
the Defendant, State Farm, as follows:
1.

On her first cause of action the Plaintiff

should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for a
breach of contract for failing to faithfully perform its
insurance contract with the Plaintiff as its first party
insured. That Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for
consequential damages of $8,826.00, which sum represents the
difference between their offer of $2,500.00 and the average
maximum amount customarily offered by insurance adjusters;
$11,326.00, as set forth in the "affidavit" of Milton Beck.
Further, the Plaintiff should be awarded that amount that
will reimburse her for any medical expenses she may incur in
11

000011

the future as a result of Defendant's actions including an
award for future physical pain and suffering, and costs of
this action.
2.

On Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action she

should be awarded a judgment for Defendant's breach of its
implied covenant to deal fairly with the Plaintiff. By
failing to provide Plaintiff with unbiased health care
providers and an independent adjuster the Defendant acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and denied Plaintiff the
reasonable and justifiable expectations of her contract.
The conflict of interest between IRA, State Farm and
Plaintiff clearly violated the spirit and terms of her
insurance contract.

That such culpable conduct justifies an

award to Plaintiff of compensatory damages in the sum of
$8,826.00 together with costs incurred herein, attorney fees
and punitive damages.
3.

On Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action Plaintiff

is entitled to a judgment for Defendant's fraudulent or
deceitful actions in providing the services of IRA and
creating the subsequent conflict of interest.

That Plaintiff

is entitled to damages in the sum of $8,826.00, damages for
future physical pain and suffering, attorney's fees,
punitive damages and costs incurred herein.
12
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,1989,

DATED this

Plaintiff's address:
6903 South 775 East
Midvale, Utah 84047

13
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FAY I. PIXTON,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)

ANSWER TO AMENDED
COMPLAINT

)

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS and INTERNATIONAL
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. C87-1665
Judge Michael R. Murphy

COMES NOW the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company and in answer to plaintifffs complaint on file
herein admits, denies and alleges as follows:
1.

That plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a

cause of action against this defendant upon which relief can be
granted.
2.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1, and 2

of the amended complaint and further admits that the plaintiff
was insured under a policy of automobile insurance issued by this
defendant which provided among other coverage personal injury
protection benefits.
3.

This defendant admits that on or about March 12, 1984,

plaintiff was the operator of an automobile which collided with
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another automobile also insured by this defendant.

And further

that the accident occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
but this defendant denies each and every other allegation of
plaintiff's complaint not otherwise admitted or denied on the
ground and for the reason that this defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information on which to form a belief as to
the truthfulness of said allegations.
4.

That the plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages.

5.

That the plaintiff by her conduct either waived any

claim that she may have against this defendant or in the alternative is estopped by virtue of her conduct from bringing any
claims against this defendant.
6.

That plaintiffs own negligence, carelessness or other

culpable conduct either personally or through her counsel contributed to any loss or damage which plaintiff may have sustained, said damage is expressly denied and that this negligence,
carelessness or other culpable conduct on the part of the plaintiff either personally or through counsel is equal to or greater
than any negligence, carelessness or other culpable conduct on
the part of this defendant and that therefore plaintiff's claims
are barred.
7.

That punitive damages are barred by the due process

clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah.
8.

That punitive damages are barred by the right against

self-incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution
of Utah.
9.

That punitive damages are barred by the cruel and

unusual punishment clause and the excessive fine clause of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article
I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Utah.
10.

That punitive damages are barred by the equal protec-

tion clause of the Fourteen Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
11.

That the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah,
prohibit any award of punitive damages unless there is an unanimous verdict.
12.

That Utah Code Annotated S76-3-302 prohibits under any

circumstances any award of punitive damages in excess of $20,000
for a corporate defendant and $10,000 for an individual defendant.
13.

That the defendant, its agents, servants or employees,

did not act with actual malice and any award of punitive damages
is therefore barred.
14.

No act or omission of this defendant was done with

reckless indifference or reckless disregard toward the rights or
safety of others and therefore any award of punitive damages is
barred.
15.

That plaintiff must prove each and every element of the

punitive damage claim beyond a reasonable doubt.
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16.

Plaintiff must prove each and every element of the

punitive damage award by clear and convincing evidence.
17.

Under no circumstances may the defendant be held

derivatively liable for the award of punitive damage.
18.

As a matter of law punitive damages may not be awarded

in this case, because any outrageous and malicious conduct which
is expressly denied and subsequent like conduct is likely to be
deterred by other means.
19.

As a matter of law punitive damages may not be awarded

in this case because this case because this case is not an
"exceptional" case.
20.

That punitive damages are barred by the contracts

clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United states constitution.
21.

That punitive damages have an unacceptable "chilling"

effect on the open courts clause of Article I, Section 11 of the
Constitution of Utah and therefore denied due process.
22.

That the law does not allow punitive damage awards in a

contract action.
WHEREFORE having fully answered plaintiff's amended complaint, this defendant prays that the plaintiff take nothing by
reason thereof, that the action be dismissed, no cause of action,
that this defendant be awarded its costs of court herein incurred
and for such other and further relief as to the court seems just
and equitable in the premises.
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DATED t h i s

n

/rxX day of

1 IA TV

, 1989,

STRONG & HANNI

IPhflip R. Fishier
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing Answer to Amended Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following on this _£_

day of

Matt Biljanic
Attorney at Law
7355 South 9th East
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Plaintiffs

f\i*W\^

, 1989.

0
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FILED BlSTBiCT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC
Philip R. Fishier, #1083
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

oy

7

7 1989
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
i ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FAY I. PIXTON,
Plaintiff,

1 Civil NO. 870901665PI
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO. OF BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS, ]
and INTERNATIONAL REHABILITATION ]
ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendants.
The Motion for Summary Judgment of the defendant, state Farm,
came on regularly for hearing on November 20, 1989 at the hour of
2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge,
with Matt Biljanic appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and Philip
R. Fishier and Stephen J. Trayner appearing on behalf of the
defendant, State Farm. The Court having heard argument of counsel,
considered the memoranda on file together with all of the other
documents now in the file including the various affidavits, and
being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that there
was no conflict on the part of Mr. Felix Jensen in handling the
first and third party claims of the plaintiff since Mr. Jensen, as
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a representative of State Farm in both capacities, was acting in
an adversarial capacity to the insured, Mrs. Pixton. Furthermore,
the Court concludes that this is a third party type of claim and
that the plaintiff waived her claim by settling the third party
personal injury action which was pending before Judge Frederick of
this Court. The Court is of the opinion that all issues concerning
the sums paid to IRA could have been presented in that action but
were not.

The Court, having considered the affidavit of Mr. Beck

filed in this case, concludes that it is not applicable to this
case since this is a third party type of claim which should have
been concluded in the litigation pending before Judge Frederick of
this Court.

The Court, therefore, being fully advised in the

premises and on the grounds and for the reasons stated above and
also as stated by the Court in it's Bench Ruling of November 20,
1989 and it appearing to the Court that there is no genuine issue
as to a material fact,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant,

State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby
granted and the claims of the plaintiff as to defendant, state
Farm, are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

7

day of

x IfS^sy /KA^

, 1989.

Michael R. Murphy, District/Jud^e
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CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

of November , 1989,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage prepaid to:
Matt Biljanic
Attorney at Law
7355 South Ninth East
Midvale, Utah 84047
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FAY I. PIXTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
SAMANTHA BIRD

)

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
)
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BLOOMINGTON)
ILLINOIS and INTERNATIONAL
)
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC.,)
Defendants.

Civil No. C87-1665
Judge Michael R. Murphy

)

Affiant, Samantha Bird, having been first duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant is a resident claims superintendent for defen-

dant, State Farm.
2.

Affiant is personally familiar with and has reviewed

State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939.
3*

State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 pertains to plain-

tiff's claim for no-fault benefits under her policy of insurance
with State Farm, policy no. 477-6467-44, and plaintiff's claim
for damages against another State Farm insured, Robert J. Davies,
arising out of an automobile accident dated March 12, 1984.
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4.

Affiant's duties include supervising the handling of

State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939.
5-

State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 has been kept in

the ordinary course of State Farm's business and the entries
found therein were made contemporaneous to the events so recorded.
6.

State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 shows that State

Farm has duly paid every medical expense or other covered expense
submitted by plaintiff to State Farm for payment relating to from
the injuries plaintiff allegedly sustained in her automobile
accident of March 12, 1984.
7.

State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 shows that State

Farm has made payments totalling $871.51, exclusive of the cost
of IRA's services, under plaintiff's no-fault insurance coverage.
8.

State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 shows that State

Farm paid $1,960.09 to IRA for its valuative services.
9.

Affiant did not refer plaintiff to Dr. Edward C. Spencer

for treatment at any time for the injuries she allegedly sustained in the subject automobile accident.
10.

Affiant is familiar with the medical report prepared by

Dr. Edward C. Spencer respecting plaintiff's medical condition
and Dr. Spencer's treatment of plaintiff for the injuries that
she allegedly sustained in the subject automobile accident.
11.

Affiant's responsibilities with defendant, state Farm

include the evaluation of cases for the purpose of making settlement offers.

As part of affiant's responsibilities, affiant

takes into consideration available medical records and reports,
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such as those prepared by Dr- Edward C. Spencer on the plaintiff,
in making settlement offers.
12-

Based upon affiant's experience in the automobile

insurance industry and her review of the medical records and
«

reports submitted by plaintiff in this matter, affiant believes
that the settlement offer accepted by plaintiff, $7,500, was fair
and equitable to all the parties concerned.
/3

DATED this

day of

i/{ML/S

, 1989.

i

*

^t^j

JSAMANTHA BIRD

ss
)

ay of

I<4&A*L£<^

, 1 9 8 _ , personally

appeared"before me Samantha Birti who duly acknowledged to me that
he has read and signed the foregoing Affidavit for and the same
are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge
and belief.

*OTAp&>PUBL
Residing S ^ L ;
My Commission Expires
/

/

•
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance CompanySixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FAY I. PIXTON,
Plaintiff,

1
I

AFFIDAVIT OF
FELIX JENSEN

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
'
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BLOOMINGTON]
ILLINOIS and INTERNATIONAL
]
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC.,]
Defendants.

Civil NO. C87-1665
Judge Michael R. Murphy

;

Affiant, Felix Jensen, having been first duly sworn deposes
and states as follows:
1.

Affiant is a claims specialist for defendant, State

2.

Affiant is personally familiar with and'has reviewed

Farm*

State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939, pertaining to plaintiff's
claim for no-fault benefits under her policy of insurance, policy
no. 477-6467-44, and plaintiff's claim for damages against
another State Farm insured, Robert J. Davies.
3.

Affiant has not at any time directed plaintiff to seek

medical treatment from Edward C. Spencer, nor has affiant ever
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recommended that plaintiff seek treatment from Dr. Spencer for
the injuries she allegedly sustained in her automobile accident
of March 12, 1984.
DATED this

/ ^7

<3~ii ^ C^

day of

, 1989.

(^<y£*r

sJ^^iu^j

FELIX J E N S E N y
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.
l

On the i'}v

day of

» J u til

/ 198j^, personally

appeared before me Felix Jensen who duly aclcnowledged to me that
he has read and signed the foregoing Affidavit for and the same
are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge
and belief.

"7
s.

'
{<& 7 If{—r^C/^l

'X/ (til

NOTARY PUBLIC
/
l
Residing at:J^ (f /,f(Jc£

^
J
/>,?,, h/^T

My Commission Expires

000026

Lowell V. Smith, #3006
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
(801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FAY I. PIXTON,
Plaintiff,

:
;:

AFFIDAVIT OF
LOWELL SMITH

\

v«

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF
BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS and
INTERNATIONAL REHABILITATION
ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendants.

:
j
!
:
;
:
:

Civil No.: C87-1665

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Affiant, Lowell Smith, having been first duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

I served as counsel for Robert J. Davies dba

Sherwood Florist and Carl E. Hothan in the action brought by
plaintiff against Mr- Davies and Mr. Hothan in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, C87-7987, for damages and
injuries allegedly arising out of an automobile accident which
occurred on March 12, 1984.
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2.

During the pendency of that litigation, Attorney

Matt Biljanic, representing Fay I. Pixton, served Interrogatories
on the Defendants, on February 4, 1988, requesting the number of
payments

made

by

State

Farm

Insurance

to

International

Rehabilitation Associates for the services rendered by State Farm
Insurance Company to Plaintiff and seeking the total amount paid
by the no-fault insurance carrier which was claimed Hexempt from
the Plaintiff's claim...".
3.

On March 4, 1988, I received a letter from State

Farm Insurance Company indicating that they had paid the sum of
$871.51 in medical expenses and $708.00 in loss of services to
Mrs, Pixton.

It was also disclosed that State Farm had made

payment of $1,960.09 to International Rehabilitation Associates
for expenses associated with the evaluative services rendered for
State Farm.
4.

Initially

objection

was

disclosure of the information sought.

made

concerning

the

However, on March 30,

1989, Defendants disclosed:
State Farm Insurance Company has paid $871.51
in medical expenses * and $708.00 in lost
services. In addition, State Farm Insurance
Company has paid $1,960.09 to International
Rehabilitation Associates.

-2-
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5.

On April 5/ 1988 Attorney Biljanic requested a

-breakdown of the $1,960.09" disclosed.

He requested whether or

not this figure included the purchase of an exercise cycle.
6.

On April 18, 1988 it was disclosed to Attorney

Biljanic that the $871.51 paid in medical expenses included the
exercycle.

In addition, State Farm paid Mrs. Pixton the sum of

$708.00 for services.

Further, State Farm paid IRA the sum of

$1,960.00.
7.
Farm

On May 24, 1988 copies of the drafts from State

Insurance

Company

to

IRA

were

forwarded

to

Attorney

Biljanic.
8.

On or about May 9, 1989, Attorney Biljanic agreed

to accept the sum of $7,500 in full and complete satisfaction of
plaintiff's claims against the alleged tort feasors, Robert J.
Davies dba Sherwood Florist and Carl E. Hothan.
9.

The matter was dismissed on June 13, 1989, by

Stipulation of the parties and by Order of the Court.
DATED this

'd-f

day of June, 1989.

LOWELL V. SMITH
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the

)
) ss.
)

^<^—

day of June, 1989, personally appeared

before me Lowell Smith who duly acknowledged to me that he has
read and signed the foregoing Affidavit for and the same are true
and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Res iding: gW/ //>A^ 6& /I htU-

A/?- 9o

-4-
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FAY I. PIXTON,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
DR. EDWARD C. SPENCER

)

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS and INTERNATIONAL
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. C87-1665
Judge Michael R. Murphy

Affiant, Edward c. Spencer, having been first duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant obtained his medical degree at George Washington

University.

He did his internship in Iowa and received a degree

in orthopedic surgery from the University of Iowa in 1975. Affiant
became board certified in 1976 in orthopedic surgery. Affiant has
been in private practice since 1975.
2.

Affiant first treated plaintiff on May 17, 1984 for

injuries plaintiff claimed to have sustained in an automobile
accident on March 12, 1984.
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3.

Affiant was not contacted by Felix Jensen or any other

employees of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and
asked to treat plaintiff's injuries.
4.

The medical history obtained by affiant from plaintiff

indicates

that

she

was

referred

to

affiant's

care

by

a

Dr. Matthews,
5. Affiant's treatment and evaluation of plaintiff's injuries
was not influenced or affected by any actions of defendant, State
Farm or its employees.
6.

Although

affiant

has

from

time

to

time

performed

independent medical examinations and given expert testimony at the
request of defendant, State Farm, affiant's prior relationship with
State Farm did not influence or affect his treatment or evaluation
of plaintiff.
7.

Affiant's treatment of plaintiff and affiant's evaluation

of plaintiff's medical condition were within the acceptable medical
standards of the community.
DATED this

i^{

day of

1989

:

2£L

Dr. Edward c.
STATE OF UTAH
SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

On the

t/

o,Si.
Spencer

#0
r *

t"

KIRKGIFFORD
IRKGIFFO

,
Salt Late Oty.mah
VlV
84103
<&>"

%fr

)

<\

E*ta
JulyZ7.1992

OF

3?
9
*

^

L*
Edward C.

day of

198^7 / personally
appeared before me Dr.
Spencer who duly acknowledged to
me that he has read and signed the foregoing Affidavit for and

the same are true and correct to the best of his information,
knowledge and belief
My Commission Expires

NOTARY/PUBVIC

residing/a

OOOO^P

